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We evaluate the effects of structural tax reforms on government spending efficiency in a sample 
of OECD economies over the period 2007-2016. After calculating input spending efficiency 
scores, we assess the relevance for efficiency of narrative tax changes in a panel setup. We find 
that: i) input efficiency scores average around 0.6-07; ii) increases in the tax rates are reflected 
in falling public sector efficiency; iii) such negative effect is significant for PIT and VAT; iv) 
controlling for endogeneity, increases in tax rates are still associated with lower public sector 
efficiency, mainly in PIT; v) increasing tax bases for PIT and VAT improve public sector 
efficiency; vi) in economic expansion periods, increasing CIT base and reducing PIT rates, 
positively affect public sector efficiency; ix) in recessions, efficiency improves when PIT and 
VAT bases increase and CIT rate increases. 
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Most countries, through time, have attempted to lift growth by increasing public 
expenditure, counting that the ensuing income would raise enough revenues to keep the fiscal 
balance from deteriorating over the long-run. However, several economies have not been able 
to mobilize revenues through taxation to the same extent as spending went up and, therefore, 
resorted to internal and external borrowing to finance (growing) deficits. At the same time, 
according to conventional wisdom, in most countries, larger budget deficits have coincided in 
the past with less efficient government spending (see, for instance, Afonso et al., 2005). 
An interesting avenue of research has linked government spending and public sector 
efficiency, an issue that has become paramount in a context of scarcer public resources, notably 
in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Several authors have made 
efforts to document the degree of government spending inefficiency at the cross-country level 
but few have tried to explain them. Against this background, a recent paper ty Afonso et al. 
(2019) reported that expenditure efficiency is usually negatively associated with taxation. More 
specifically, they found that direct and indirect taxes negatively affected government efficiency 
performance, and the same being true for social security contributions. 
The relevance of tax structures in both developed and developing countries is many fold.1 
The distinction and the choice between different types of taxes such as direct vs indirect taxes, 
for instance, has been an important field of applied research, regarding notably their respective 
economic growth (un)friendliness.2 
In this paper, we contribute to literature by taking a novel view towards the idea that also 
structural tax reforms, and not necessarily only changes in revenues, can affect the degree of 
efficiency of the public sector. Tax reforms are needed not only to attain their first objective of 
raising more revenues, but also secondary objectives such as minimizing their distortionary 
growth and income distribution effects.3 We explore yet another previously unexplored channel 
which is whether such reforms help governments offer public services more or less efficiently. 
                                                          
1 Taxation provides resources to the government to perform critical roles such as economic stabilization, allocation 
and redistribution (Musgrave, 1959). This is particularly relevant in the developing world where collecting more 
taxes from domestic sources can help achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This is the reason why 
the Addis Ababa Agenda for financing development pays special attention to domestic resource mobilization in 
emerging and low-income countries and SDG 17.1 tracks country level domestic resource mobilization efforts. 
2 The main channel is that corporate and personal income taxes reduce incentives to raise supply through capital 
accumulation or productivity enhancements (Schwellnus and Arnold, 2008; Vartia, 2008; Galindo and Pombo, 
2011). 
3 Common reforms include a shift from trade taxes to domestic sales taxes, the rationalization of income taxes and 
increase of its progressivity. Another commonly considered policy action includes the shift of the revenue mix 
away from corporate or personal income tax towards consumption (value-added) and property taxes, which could 
be growth-enhancing (IMF, 2014). 
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If one observes a decrease in tax revenues, either due to a decline of the tax base or a reduction 
in a tax rate, and at the end, this can have a direct contractionary effect on the spending side of 
the government budget. Assuming that the level of public services might still be similar, that 
would imply an increase in efficiency. Alternatively, an increase in tax revenues through 
increases in the tax base or rate can increase or not government unnecessary spending.    
In this paper we use a new “narrative” database of tax changes put together by Amaglobeli 
et al. (2018) for a sample of 23 advanced and emerging market economies over the last four 
decades. We then select all the changes in both tax rates and tax bases of the main tax categories, 
according to their weight on the total government revenues, namely: personal income taxes 
(PIT), corporate income taxes (CIT) and value-added taxes (VAT). An important novelty and 
strength of this database is the precise timing and nature of key legislative tax actions.  
Afterwards, we follow a three-step approach. First, we compute composite indicators of 
government performance. Second, we calculate so-called input efficiency scores for the period 
2016-2017. Third, we assess the relevance of the narrative tax changes on the level of the 
efficiency in a panel setup. 
While this new database provides, arguably, an exogenous source for tax reforms, 
endogeneity can still be a potentially significant concern in our framework since revenue 
mobilization efforts may not necessarily be exogenous events. We try to address this 
methodological challenge by controlling for expected economic growth at the time of tax 
reforms and other possible drivers of government spending efficiency and employing 
endogeneity robust econometric techniques. 
The main findings can be summarized as follows. The average efficiency score 
throughout the period is around 0.6-07 implying that government spending could be lower by 
around 30%-40%, on average. We also find a decrease in input efficiency scores around the 
GFC, and an improvement afterwards. 
Regarding the narrative tax base dataset, we observe that countries that increase the tax 
rates of at least one of the taxes (PIT, CIT or VAT) experience a fall in the level of public sector 
efficiency. This negative effect seems to operate mainly for PIT and VAT.  
Furthermore, controlling for endogeneity, difference-GMM estimations are consistent 
with previous results: i) increasing tax rate reforms worsens public sector efficiency, mainly 
due to PIT; ii) increasing tax base reforms improve efficiency, mainly due to PIT and VAT.  
Finally, we test if the effect of the tax reforms on public sector efficiency varies across 
different economic environments, such as recession and expansion. The negative effect of 
reforms that increase the tax rate occurs mainly in expansion periods, particularly for CIT. 
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Similarly, during expansion periods, reforms that decrease the PIT rate are positively associated 
with efficiency. In contrast, during recession periods we find opposite effects: CIT rate 
increases improve efficiency and PIT rate decreases worsens efficiency. In terms of tax base 
reforms, we find that CIT base increases in expansion periods improves efficiency, while in 
recessions periods, efficiency worsens if CIT tax base increases and it improves when PIT and 
VAT tax bases increase. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. As background, context and 
motivation for our empirical analysis, section two provides an overview of related literature. 
Section three explains the empirical methodology. Section four discusses the empirical results. 
The last section, concludes and elaborates on policy implications. 
 
2. Literature Review  
Previous studies looking specifically to the effectiveness of the public sector (and/or its 
sub-sectors) have addressed questions such as: are public services satisfactory considering the 
amount of resources allocated to its activity?; could one have better results using the same 
amount of resources?; could one obtain the same results with lower expenses?; can one measure 
cross-country/cross-sector/cross-institution efficiency levels and determine benchmark units? 
Afonso and Schuknecht (2019) highlight how governments can improve their overall 
level of efficiency in terms of the provision of their services, which remains a very topical issue. 
Indeed, most previous studies reported that government spending efficiency could be enhanced 
in most OECD countries (see e.g., Afonso et al., 2005, 2010; Afonso and Kazemi, 2018). For 
instance, Adam et al. (2011), looking at a sample of 19 OECD countries between 1980 and 
2000, reported that countries with right-wing and strong governments, high voter participation 
rates and decentralized fiscal systems, were expected to have more efficient public sectors.  
Afonso and Gaspar (2007) illustrated numerically that government financing through 
distortional taxation causes excess burden (deadweight loss) magnifying the costs of 
inefficiency. Boadway et al. (1994) rightly mentioned that the tax mix poses several challenges 
to public finance and can lead to different economic outcomes. Related literature also found 
that higher taxes typically generate negative consequences for growth by affecting consumption 
and investment decisions (Feldstein, 2012).4  
Earlier theoretical studies on taxation show how higher taxes tend to discourage 
investment rates (Auerbach and Hasset, 1992) as well as labor supply of individuals (Hausman, 




1985) and productivity growth. Empirically, a number of studies support the hypothesis that 
distortive taxes hold back growth more than others (Koester and Kormendi, 1989; Plosser, 
1992; Kneller et al., 1999; Gemmell et al., 2011, 2014; Johansson, 2016; Drucker et al., 2017). 
Corporate and personal income taxes are considered more distortionary than consumption or 
property taxes as shown by Arnold et al. (2011). Similarly, McNabb and LeMay-Boucher 
(2014) and Drucker et al. (2017) found that reducing the share of income taxes in the revenue 
mix would raise GDP growth. Acosta-Ormaechea and Yoo (2019) confirmed that consumption 
and property taxes are more growth friendly than income taxes. Helms (1985) and Mofidi and 
Stone (1990) found that taxes revenue spent on publicly provided productive inputs tend to 
enhance growth. Against this background, Afonso et al. (2019) evaluated to what extent the 
specificities of a tax system (proxied by revenue-to-GDP ratios) could contribute to government 
spending efficiency. Other authors used endogenous growth models to simulate the effects of 
tax reforms on economic growth and found that a decrease in the distorting effects of the current 
tax structure may lead to a permanent increase in economic growth (Engen and Gale, 1996).  
Ultimately, the linkages between the two sides of the government budget, that is, 
revenue and spending, can convey how fiscal policy is set-up in practice. These are, to great 
extent, policy decisions since one can typically envisage one-way causality from spending 
(revenue) to revenue (spending), i.e. “spend-and-tax” (“tax-and-spend” – Friedman, 1978; 
Chang et al., 2002) causality, two-way causality (fiscal synchronization hypothesis) or no 
linkages between revenue and spending (von Furstenberg et al., 1986).  
The tax-and-spend hypothesis advocates that tax increases will lead to expenditure 
increases without reducing the budget deficit. Under the spend-and-tax hypothesis, a 
government’s revenue constraint adjusts to changes in expenditures with some lag. The fiscal 
synchronization hypothesis suggests that expenditure and revenue decisions are made jointly. 
Thereby, as advanced by Musgrave (1966), the marginal benefits and the marginal costs of 
government services are compared by citizens in order to determine the appropriate levels of 
expenditures and revenues. Payne (1998) found that in most countries the tax-and-spend 
hypothesis was supported suggesting that any policy to reduce budget deficits via revenues may 
not result in deficit reduction. On the other hand, Moore and Zanardi (2011) report that central 
governments in developing countries do not seem to adjust government spending priorities 
taking into account trade tax revenues-to-GDP ratios, which is would not validate the tax-and-
spend hypothesis. 
Other studies evaluate the role of individual taxes, such as VAT, as effective tools to 
reduce central government debt and deficits without increasing government expenditures 
6 
 
(Ufier, 2017). Understanding the effect of tax reforms on public sector efficiency has been 
largely ignored in the literature which is exactly the gap this paper aims to bridge. Interestingly, 
Barone and Mocetti (2011), using Italian municipalities data, find that taxpayers have a better 
mood vis-à-vis paying taxes if government revenues are spent in a more efficient fashion.  
 
 3. Methodology and Data 
3.1. Public Sector Performance and Efficiency Scores 
The most commonly used approach to compute the efficiency scores is Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA), which is a non-parametric technique that uses linear 
programming to compute the production frontier. Formally, for each country i, we have: 
 
  𝑌𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑋𝑖), 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛  (1) 
 
where 𝑌 (Public Sector Performance, PSP) is the composite output measure, and 𝑋 is the input 
measure, namely Public Expenditure (PE) as a percentage of GDP.  
 Following the related literature, we use a set of metrics to construct a composite of 
public sector performance (PSP), as suggested by Afonso et al. (2005, 2019). PSP is the average 
between opportunity and Musgravian indicators.  
The opportunity indicators reflect the governments’ performance in the administration, 
education, health and infrastructure sectors. The administration sub-indicator includes the 
following measures: corruption, burden of government regulation (red tape), judiciary 
independence, shadow economy and the property rights. To measure the education sub-
indicator, we use the secondary school enrolment rate, quality of educational system and PISA 
scores. For the health sub-indicator, we compile data on the infant survival rate, life expectancy 
and survival rate from cardiovascular diseases (CVD), cancer, diabetes or chronic respiratory 
diseases (CRD). The infrastructure sub-indicator is measured by the quality of overall 
infrastructure.  
The Musgravian indicators include three sub-indicators: distribution, stability and 
economic performance. To measure income distribution and inequality, we use the Gini 
coefficient. For the stability sub-indicator, we use the coefficient of variation for the 5-year 
average of GDP growth and standard deviation of 5 years inflation.  To measure economic 




Accordingly, the opportunity and Musgravian indicators result from the average of the 
measures included in each sub-indicator. To ensure a convenient benchmark, each sub-indicator 
measure is first normalized by dividing the value of a specific country by the average of that 
measure for all the countries in the sample.   
 Our input measure, Public Expenditure (PE) as a percentage of GDP, weights each area 
of government expenditure. More specifically, we consider government consumption as input 
for administrative performance, government expenditure in education as input for education 
performance, health expenditure as input for health performance and public investment as input 
for infrastructure performance. For the distribution indicator, we consider expenditures on 
transfers and subsidies. The stability and economic performance are related to the total 
expenditure. Table A1 and A2 in Appendix A provide further information on the sources and 
variable construction.    
 Returning to Equation (1), inefficiency occurs when 𝑌𝑖 < 𝑓(𝑋𝑖), implying that for an 
observed level of input, the actual output is smaller than the best attainable output.  
To compute the efficiency scores, we adopt an input orientation and assume variable-
returns to scale (VRS), to account for the fact that countries might not operate at the optimal 
scale. The input-oriented approach allows us to evaluate by how much input quantity can be 
proportionally reduced without changing the output quantities. Alternatively, an output-
oriented approach allows us to assess how much output quantities can be proportionally 
increased without changing the input quantities. The two measures provide the same results 
under constant returns to scale but give different values under variable returns to scale. 
Nevertheless, it seems to be more adequate to use an input-oriented setup since the main focus 
of our analysis relies on decreasing inputs (via both less taxes and less spending).  





𝑠. 𝑡.  − 𝑦𝑖 + 𝑌𝜆 ≥ 0 
𝜃𝑥𝑖 − 𝑋𝜆 ≥ 0 
𝐼1’𝜆 = 1 
𝜆 ≥  0 
 
(2) 
where 𝑦𝑖 is a vector of outputs, 𝑥𝑖 is a vector of inputs, 𝜃  is the efficiency scores, 𝜆 is a vector 
of constants, and 𝐼1’ is a vector of ones.  
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 If  𝜃 < 1 , the country is inside the production frontier (i.e., it is inefficient), and if 𝜃 =
1, the country is on the frontier (i.e., it is efficient). 
The efficiency scores are computed for all OECD countries5 between the period of 2006 
and 2017, except for Mexico. We exclude Mexico because the country is efficient by default, 
and data heterogeneity is important for the sample analysis.  
 
3.2. Panel Analysis 
In the second stage, we empirically assess to what extent structural tax reforms have an 
impact on the previously computed DEA input efficiency scores. Specifically, we estimate the 
following reduced-form panel data specification: 
 
𝜃𝑖𝑡  = 𝛽𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖 + 𝑆𝑖𝑡−1
′ 𝛽1 +  𝑍𝑖𝑡−1′𝛽2 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡     (3) 
 
where i refers to a given country and t the time period (in years). 𝛽𝑖 denotes country fixed effects 
to control for unobserved heterogeneity such as geography-specific time invariant 
characteristics. 𝛽𝑡 denotes time (year) effects to control for global macroeconomic shocks. 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
is a disturbance term satisfying standard assumptions of zero mean and constant variance. 
Equation (3) is initially estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with robust 
standard errors clustered at the country level. Because time-series cross-sectional data typically 
display both contemporaneous correlation across units and unit level heteroskedasticity making 
inference from standard errors produced by OLS incorrect, we also employ Beck and Katz´s 
(1995) panel-corrected standard error (PCSE) estimator. This estimator is robust to the 
possibility of non-spherical errors and allow for better inference from linear models estimated 
in a panel environment. Concerned about autocorrelation of the disturbances, a common AR(1) 
process is assumed.  
Our dependent variable, 𝜃𝑖𝑡, is the DEA input efficient scores, computed in the previous 
subsection. The input orientation scores flag that higher efficiency is determined by a country’s 
ability to minimize spending-to GDP ratios by maintaining the same level of public services 
provision.  
                                                          
5 The 35 OECD countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.  
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𝑍𝑖𝑡−1 is a vector of country specific time-varying sociodemographic, macroeconomic 
and institutional controls that may affect public sector performance. This vector is lagged one 
year to minimize reverse causality concerns. More specifically, vector 𝑍𝑖𝑡−1 includes: i) a proxy 
for the country size, defined as the logarithm of domestic residents to control for the monitoring 
costs of government’s discretional behavior (Grossman et al., 1999); ii) a proxy of economic 
and technological development given by the logarithm of the number of internet users; iii) a 
variable related to tourism inflow which might have an impact on the demand of public services 
(proxied by tourism revenues as share of exports); iv) a measure of fiscal imbalances (proxied 
by the primary balance and the debt-to-GDP ratio); v) a political dummy identifying if the 
government´s political ideology is  left wing and zero otherwise.  
Countries determine the composition of their tax system by making policy changes to 
tax bases and tax rates. Our key regressors are included in vector 𝑆𝑖𝑡−1, comprising tax reform 
variables that capture changes (increases or decreases) in both the tax rate and the tax base of 
three types of taxes (PIT, CIT and VAT).  
Data on structural tax reforms come from Amaglobeli et al. (2018) which is now 
explored carefully in this paper. This dataset covers 23 advanced and emerging market 
economies.6 From this database, we select all the tax reforms that were implemented between 
2005 and 2016. When the year of implementation was not available in the database, we 
considered the year of announcement. Note that to minimize reverse causality concerns, we 
evaluate the effect of one-year lag reforms on public sector efficiency. The intersection between 
this tax reform dataset and the sample of 35 countries for which we have computed input 
efficiency scores gives a working sample of 18 advanced economies.  
Amaglobeli et al. (2018) dataset has several advantages for our own empirical purposes: 
identifies the precise nature and exact timing of tax actions in key areas of tax policy; identifies 
the precise tax reforms that underpin what otherwise looks like a gradual improvement in 
standard tax-to-GDP ratios; identifies reforms that truly led to increases or decreases in revenue, 
as opposed to just a long list of (small or not economically meaningful) policy changes. The 
strengths of this “narrative” tax reform database come with one limitation; because two tax 
reforms in a given area (for example, a change in PIT) can involve different specific actions 
(for example, rate changes or base changes), only the average impact across historical tax 
reforms can be estimated. It should be noted that the tax reform database provides no 
                                                          
6 The database includes the following countries: Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, 
Greece, Germany, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, 
and the United States. 
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information regarding the current (or past) fiscal stance in the countries under scrutiny, which 
is not the purpose of this paper.  
We focus on the changes in both the tax rates and tax bases of PIT, CIT and VAT. 
Indeed, in the last year covered in the sample (2017) in the 18 advanced economies, those taxes 
accounted on average for 54% of total revenues excluding social security and grants 
(ICTD/UNU-WIDER, 2019). To assess whether upward or downward changes have 
differentiated effects on the level of the government efficiency, we also discriminate between 
these two policy measures.  
Therefore, we define the following independent variables: a set of dummy variables for 
changes (increases or decreases) in the base and rate of PIT, CIT and VAT in a specific year. 
For example, the variable D base increase, t-1, is a dummy variable equal to one if a country 
increased the tax base of PIT, CIT or VAT in the previous year and zero otherwise.   
 Table 1 presents stylized facts on tax reforms for PIT, CIT and VAT in our sample of 
18 advanced economies between 2005 and 2016, with two 6-year sub-periods. The vast 
majority of tax revenue reforms in our sample were in the category of PIT, followed by the CIT, 
and most reforms were implemented during the period 2005-2010. Over the entire period, we 
also see that there were a larger share of PIT and CIT policy changes towards base and rate 




Figure 1 provides the number of tax reforms by tax category by country to illustrate the 
heterogeneity of reform efforts. PIT reforms have been more frequently implemented (close to 
50 percent on average across all 18 countries in the sample). In general, fewer major reforms 
have been implemented in VAT. Some countries were more active in tax reforms that others: 
on the active side we have countries such as Portugal, Spain and Italy; on the less active side 





Figure 1. Number of tax reforms by country  
(18 advanced economies, 2005-2016) 
 
Source: Authors´ computations. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Government Efficiency: Stylized Facts 
We performed the DEA computations for three models: a baseline model (Model 0), 
with only one input (PE as percentage of GDP) and one output (PSP); Model 1 with one input, 
governments’ normalized total spending (PE) and two outputs, the opportunity PSP and the so-
called “Musgravian” PSP scores; and Model 2 with two inputs, governments’ normalized 
spending on opportunity and on “Musgravian” indicators and one output, total PSP scores. The 
results obtained from these three models are illustrated respectively on Tables B.1, B.2 and B.3 
of Appendix B. 
Table 2 provides a summary of the DEA results for the three models using an input-
oriented assessment. The average efficiency score throughout the period is around 0.6 for the 1 
input and 1 output model (Model 0) and around 0.7 in the alternative models (Models 1 and 2). 
This implies that some possible efficiency gains could be achieved with around less 30% 




Figure 2 illustrates the production possibility frontier for the baseline model (Model 0), 













the countries that define the frontier: Chile, Korea, and Switzerland. For all the other countries 
inside the frontier, theoretically there would be room for improvement 
 
Figure 2. Production Possibility Frontier 







Note: in the vertical axis we have the total Public Sector Performance (PSP) composite indicator (refer to 
section 3.1 for details). 
Source: Authors´ computations. 
 
Since we are interested in evaluating to what extent the changes in the tax structures 
impinge on the input efficiency scores throughout time, we report in Figure 3 the development 
of the input efficiency scores for some countries (for model 2, as an example). Interestingly, we 













































































































improvement takes place. Here one can think of a possible correlation between the need to 
implement fiscal consolidations measures in the aftermath of the crisis, notably a decrease in 
government spending, and the ensuing increase in the measured efficiency scores (plausible if 
rather the same level of services offered by the government is kept). 
 
Figure 3. Input efficiency scores (model 2) 
 




2c – Poland 
 
2d – Spain 
  
Note: in the vertical axis we report the DEA input efficiency scores using VRS (refer to refer to section 3.1 for 
details). 
Source: Authors´ computations. 
 
4.2. Effects of Structural Tax Reforms on Government Efficiency 
4.2.1 Baseline 
In this sub-section we present the baseline results from estimating Equation (3) using 
OLS and PCSE methods. This is a reduced-form exercise aimed at quantifying the effects of 
tax reforms of different types on the degree of public sector efficiency. Although they do not 
yet directly address endogeneity, these estimates provide a benchmark. Table 3 presents the 
14 
 
results using DEA efficiency scores based on Model 2as dependent variable.7 In this table, all 
three types of tax reforms (PIT, CIT and VAT) are combined into several dummy measures 
evaluating if a country increased or decreased the tax base or it increased or decreased the tax 
rate.  Specifications (1) and (5) present the estimated results for our key variables of interest 
including country fixed effects, in specifications (2) and (6) we add year fixed effects, 
specifications (3) and (7)  include the control variables and country fixed effects (without year 
fixed effects) and specifications (4) and (8) presents the full model.  
We observe that countries that increased the tax rate experienced a fall in the level of 
public sector efficiency. This result is robust to the inclusion of additional controls and using 
both OLS and PCSE estimators (specifications 3-4 and 7-8). One can consider that higher tax 
rates (and tax revenues) might feed in into the tax-and-spend causality. Hence, governments 
might also increase the spending side of their budgets, without necessarily relevant increases in 
public sector provision.8 
As far as other explanatory variables are concerned, we find that an increase on 
country’s primary balance, possibly through a reduction on public expenditures, and an increase 
on the level of economic and technological development, measured by the number of internet 
users, positively and significantly affect efficiency.  Consistent with previous literature, public 
sector efficiency increases with the country’s population but only in the PCSE specifications. 
This can be seen as evidence of gains via scale economies. Table C.1 in Appendix C, presents 
our baseline results using alternative DEA-based models, namely Model 0 (one input and one 
output) and Model 1 (one input and two outputs) as discussed earlier. We continue to find a 
negative effect of tax rate increases on efficiency in both estimators supporting the tax-and-
spend causality. Additionally, we find a positive a significant effect of tax base decreases on 




Table 4 shows the estimation results disaggregated by tax type using the full model (with 
control variables and year and country fixed effects) and both estimators. The negative effect 
of tax rate increases on public sector efficiency seems to operate for all three taxes, however, it 
is only significant for PIT and VAT (in specifications 1 and 5). Note, however, that these 
                                                          
7 Recall that Model 2 uses two inputs, governments’ normalized spending on opportunity and on “Musgravian” 
indicators and one output, total PSP scores. 




coefficients lose statistical significance when we use the PCSE estimator. We also find that a 
decrease on the base of VAT is associated with an increase in public sector efficiency for both 
estimators (OLS and PCSE). Regarding the control variables, we find that population, primary 
balance and number of internet users continue to positively affect public sector efficiency. The 
ratio of debt to GDP negatively affects efficiency in the PCSE specifications.  
 
[Table 4] 
Next, we conduct several sensitivity and robustness analyses. 
 
4.2.2 Sensitivity and Robustness 
We performed sensitivity analysis to inspect if a given country is driving the results. That 
is, we dropped one country at a time and inspect the stability of the tax reforms effects on public 
sector efficiency. Figure 4 plots a summary of this exercise with 90 percent confidence intervals 
for the full model presented in Column 4 of Table 3. We can see that the magnitudes of the tax 
reforms dummies do not change much, and the negative statistical significance coefficient of 
tax rate increases also hold for each country.  
 
Figure 4. Sensitivity of tax reform changes to dropping one country at a time 
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Tax reforms could be implemented because of concerns regarding the future evolution of 
economic activity. To address this issue, we control for the expected values in t-1 of future real 
GDP growth. These are taken from the fall issue of the IMF World Economic Outlook for year t-
1. Table C.2 in Appendix C shows the results from adding growth expectations into our baseline 
set of controls. We observe that resulting estimates are in line with those presented in Table 3. 
In addition, equation (3) was re-estimated using Simar and Wilson´s (2007) approach. 
This method is described by the authors as a superior approach to alternatives such as OLS 
since this type of naïve estimators ignore that estimated DEA efficiency scores are calculated 
from a common sample of data and treating them as if they were independent observations is 
not appropriate.9 Simar and Wilson (2007) procedure takes this (and other pitfalls) into account 
by constructing an underlying data generating process consistent with two-stage estimation 
implying a truncated regression model. Table 5 shows the results using the full model and 
separately for each type of tax reform. Again, countries that implement reforms that increase 
the tax rate, more specifically in the PIT, experience a reduction of public sector efficiency. 
Moreover, reforms that decrease the PIT rate are associated with a significant increase on 
efficiency. We also find a positive and significant effect of reforms that decrease the tax base, 
mainly on VAT, on public sector efficiency. In terms of control variables, we continue to find 




The models that we have been estimating are all reduced-form and therefore do not 
allow making causal statements or even quantifying the clean effect of tax reforms on public 
sector efficiency. Adding covariates partly corrects for these biases, but endogeneity can still 
arise from other omitted variables (unobserved heterogeneity and selection effects), 
measurement errors in variables, and reverse causality (simultaneity). Because causality can 
run in both directions, some of the right-hand-side regressors may be correlated with the error 
term. Preliminary investigation revealed that the dependent variable was serially correlated 
such that we are required to use a dynamic panel approach to get consistent estimates of 
Equation (3).  
                                                          
9 Problems related to invalid inference due to serial correlation arise. 
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Therefore, we employ a dynamic panel estimator, the Generalized Moments Method 
(GMM) estimator by Arellano & Bond (1991). Dynamic estimators have the following 
advantages: i) greater control of endogeneity; ii) greater control of possible collinearity between 
explanatory variables; and iii) greater effectiveness in controlling effects caused by the absence 
of relevant explanatory variables for the results. GMM estimators are unbiased and compared 
with OLS or fixed-effects (within-group) estimators, exhibit the smallest bias and variance 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991). The GMM estimator can only be considered valid if: i) the 
restrictions, a consequence of use of the instruments, are valid; and ii) there is no second-order 
autocorrelation.10 
Table 6 shows the results for the difference GMM estimator using the full model.11 
Consistent with the previous results, we continue to find that countries that implemented 
reforms that increase the tax rate are associated with a decrease on public sector efficiency. This 
decrease in efficiency is mainly due to reforms on PIT. Differently from previous estimators, 
efficiency is positively affected by reforms that increase the tax base. Nonetheless, when we 
evaluate each type of tax, none of the coefficients is statistically significant. As for the control 
variables, we find that lag efficiency and primary balance positively and statistically affect 
public sector efficiency. 
[Table 6] 
 
We investigated the stability of GMM results and checked whether the coefficients of 
interest varied in size, sign and significance with two sets of sensitivity checks. Specifically, 
we i) dropped non-significant covariates one at a time; and ii) assessed if estimates were 
sensitive to the choice of lags or the choice of instruments. On the first test, we believe it is 
preferable to keep insignificant variables in to avoid any possible omitted variable bias, but if 
the covariates in question do not add information, then their exclusion should not affect the 
coefficients of the remaining variables. This is exactly what we found when we re-estimated 
equation (3) by difference-GMM dropping sequentially each of the insignificant covariates. On 
the second test, lag choice, it is well-known that GMM instrument-generating process can create 
                                                          
10 To test the validity of the restrictions, we use the Hansen test. The null hypothesis indicates that the restrictions 
imposed by using the instruments are valid.  By non rejecting the null hypothesis, we conclude that the restrictions 
are valid, and the results robust.We test for the existence of first and second-order autocorrelation. The null 
hypothesis is that there is no autocorrelation. Non rejecting the null hypothesis of non-existence of second-order 
autocorrelation, we conclude that the results are robust. For the results of the GMM estimator to be considered 
robust, the restrictions imposed by use of the instruments have to be valid and there can be no second-order 
autocorrelation. 
11 We equally tried estimating Equation (3) with a system GMM estimator and the tenor of the results was very 
similar to the difference GMM. These results are available on Table C.3 of Appendix C. 
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“too many instruments,” in the sense that some may be “weak” leading to inefficient estimates 
(Roodman 2009). We re-ran the GMM models with shorter lags (one year, instead of two) and 
with a shorter set of instruments (in particular, we excluded country-specific time dummies 
from the instrument set). Here too, the point estimates of the coefficients were not statistically 
different from the results in Table 6. 
A weakness of GMM estimators is that their properties hold when N is large, so they can be 
severely biased and imprecise in panel data with a small number of cross-sectional units. This 
is often the case in most macro panels, such as the one employed in this paper. Mindful of this 
we use the Least Squares Dummy Variable Corrected (LSDC-C) procedure which is based upon 
the bias approximations derived in Bruno (2005), who extends the result by Kiviet (1999) and 
Bun and Kiviet (2003) to unbalanced panels. Earlier Monte Carlo studies (Arellano and Bond 
1991; Kiviet 1995; Judson and Owen 1999) demonstrate that LSDV, although inconsistent, has 
a relatively small variance compared to GMM estimators. Hence, LSDV-C emerges as a good 
alternative estimator for dynamic panel data models with small N and strictly exogenous 
regressors. That said, one should not forget an important limitation of the procedure: as opposed 
to GMM estimators, no version of LSDV-C is applicable in the presence of endogenous, or 
even only weakly exogenous, regressors.  
Table 7 shows the results using the full model. We continue to find that reforms associated 
with tax rate increases negatively affect government efficiency, but the effect is only 
statistically significant for PIT and VAT. Consistent with OLS, PCSE and Simar-Wilson 




Finally, we explore the role of business cycle conditions in affecting the effect of tax 
reforms on public sector efficiency. Equation 3 is transformed to allow tax reforms´ effects to 
vary with the state of the economy, as follows: 
 




𝐻 × (1 − 𝐹(𝑧
𝑖,𝑡
))𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝑍𝑖𝑡−1′𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (4) 
 
with  𝐹(𝑧𝑖𝑡) =
exp (−𝛾𝑧𝑖𝑡)
1+exp (−𝛾𝑧𝑖𝑡)
,     𝛾 > 0, in which 𝑧𝑖𝑡 is an indicator of the state of the economy 
(the real GDP growth) normalized to have zero mean and unit variance. The weights assigned 
to each regime vary between 0 and 1 according to the weighting function 𝐹(. ), so that 𝐹(𝑧𝑖𝑡) can 
19 
 
be interpreted as the probability of being in a given state of the economy. The coefficients 𝜌𝐿 and 
𝜌𝐻 capture the public sector efficiency impact of tax reforms in cases of extreme recessions 
(𝐹(𝑧𝑖𝑡) ≈ 1 when z goes to minus infinity) and booms (1 − 𝐹(𝑧𝑖𝑡) ≈ 1 when z goes to plus 
infinity), respectively.12 This approach is inspired by the smooth transition autoregressive 
(STAR) model developed by Granger and Teräsvirta (1993).  
 Table 8 shows the results of estimating the state contingent equation (4) using 
difference-GMM estimators.  During an expansion period, reforms that increase the tax base 
positively affect public sector efficiency. Considering the type of taxes, this positive effect is 
mostly driven by CIT. Efficiency also increases when a country decreases the VAT tax base. 
Public sector performance also improves when the PIT rate decreases.  In contrast, reforms that 
increase the tax rate negatively affect efficiency, particularly on CIT.  
Turning to recession periods, efficiency improves when a country increases the PIT and 
VAT tax bases and increases the CIT and VAT tax rate. Nevertheless, efficiency diminishes 
when a country increases the CIT tax base and decreases the PIT tax rate.  
 
 [Table 8] 
 
We also considered recessions obtained by applying the Harding and Pagan (2002) 
algorithm to identify economic turning points and use alternative estimator procedures (PCSE 
and System-GMM). Results remain qualitatively similar. 
 
5. Conclusion  
 We have evaluated the effects of structural tax reforms on government spending 
efficiency in a sample of OECD economies over the period 2007-2016. We begin by computing, 
via data envelopment analysis, government spending efficiency measures for each country and 
year in our sample. Then, we empirically assess in a reduced-form regression the relevance of 
arguably exogenous structural tax reforms on these efficiency measures. 
The main findings of our study can be summarized as follows.  The average efficiency 
score throughout the period is around 0.6-07 implying government spending could theoretically 
be lower by around 30–40%, whilst maintaining the same level of PSP. The countries 
                                                          
12 We choose 𝛾 = 1.5, following Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012, 2013), so that the economy spends about 20 
percent of the time in a recessionary regime—defined as 𝐹(𝑧𝑖𝑡) > 0.8. Our results hardly change when using 




delineating the production possibility frontier are Chile, Korea, and Switzerland. In addition, 
we find a decline in input efficiency scores around the GFC, and an improvement afterwards. 
We observe that countries that increased the tax rates of at least one of the taxes (PIT, 
CIT or VAT) experience a fall in the level of public sector efficiency. Indeed, governments 
might increase also the spending side of their budgets, without necessarily relevant increases in 
public sector provision. The negative effect of an increase of tax rates on public sector 
efficiency seems to operate mainly on PIT and VAT. 
Accounting for endogeneity, the results of the difference-GMM estimations are 
consistent with the previous results: i) reforms that increase the tax rate are associated with a 
decrease on public sector efficiency, mainly due through PIT;  ii) reforms that increase the tax 
base for positively affect public sector efficiency, mainly due to PIT and VAT.   
Finally, we test if the effect of the tax reforms on public sector efficiency varies across 
different economic environments, such as recession and expansion. The negative effect of 
reforms that increase the tax rate occurs mainly in expansion periods, particularly for CIT. 
Similarly, during expansion periods, reforms that decrease the PIT rate are positively associated 
with efficiency. In contrast, during recession periods we find opposite effects: CIT rate 
increases improve efficiency and PIT rate decreases worsens efficiency. In terms of tax base 
reforms, we find that CIT base increases in expansion periods improves efficiency, while in 
recessions periods, efficiency worsens if CIT base increases and it improves when PIT and 
VAT bases increase. 
Our results leave some questions open for future research. Perhaps most importantly, cross-
country public sector efficiency differences go way beyond the tax reform areas covered in this 
paper and include, among others, reforms in areas such as pension, unemployment insurance 
schemes and healthcare systems. A more systematic investigation of their aggregate effects on 
public sector efficiency would, therefore, be welcomed. In addition, the effect of tax reforms 
on efficiency outcomes is likely to vary across countries depending on their specific structural 
characteristics, particularly those of a political economy nature.13 Further investigating these 
could shed light on the extent and underlying drivers of cross-country heterogeneity in the 
government efficiency impacts of reforms more generally. Lastly, this paper did not elaborate 
on tax efficiency considerations nor did it look at whether the tax composition resulting from 
tax reforms was optimal from a welfare point of view. This could also be an avenue of future 
research.  
                                                          
13 Political barriers are in part responsible for a reliance on narrow technocratic reforms which are being ineffective 
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Table 1. Number of tax reforms by instrument and sub-period 
 
Tax instrument \ Year 2005-2010 2011-2016 2005-2016 
PIT 82 51 133 
Rate changes 20 15 35 
Increases  6 11 17 
Decreases  14 4 18 
Base changes 62 36 98 
Increases  21 20 41 
Decreases  41 16 57 
CIT 49 38 87 
Rate changes 17 10 27 
Increases  7 3 10 
Decreases  10 7 17 
Base changes 32 28 60 
Increases  13 9 22 
Decreases  19 19 38 
VAT 19 15 34 
Rate changes 14 12 26 
Increases  6 9 15 
Decreases  8 3 11 
Base changes 5 3 8 
Increases  2 3 5 
Decreases  3 0 3 
Source: Authors´ computations. 
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Table 2 – Summary of DEA results (input efficiency scores) 
    2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Model 0 Efficient 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 2 2 
 































 Average 0.64 0.62 0.60 0.61 0.59 0.58 0.58 0.59 0.65 0.64 0.65 0.66 
 Median 0.60 0.58 0.55 0.58 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.62 0.61 0.64 0.65 
 Min 0.46 0.43 0.41 0.45 0.42 0.41 0.40 0.41 0.43 0.43 0.46 0.46 
 Max 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
  Stdev 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.14 






































 Average 0.70 0.67 0.65 0.68 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.68 0.73 0.72 0.73 0.73 
 Median 0.66 0.63 0.60 0.65 0.61 0.63 0.63 0.66 0.70 0.70 0.71 0.73 
 Min 0.52 0.47 0.47 0.54 0.51 0.50 0.49 0.48 0.50 0.52 0.53 0.50 
 Max 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
  Stdev 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.13 

















































 Average 0.71 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.65 0.65 0.66 0.68 0.70 0.71 0.71 0.73 
 Median 0.67 0.65 0.63 0.64 0.60 0.61 0.63 0.63 0.67 0.70 0.69 0.72 
 Min 0.49 0.43 0.47 0.50 0.49 0.48 0.50 0.50 0.48 0.53 0.52 0.52 
 Max 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
  Stdev 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.13 
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Table 3. Baseline Estimation for input efficiency scores: OLS and PCSE, Model 2 
 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Estimator  OLS OLS OLS OLS PCSE PCSE PCSE PCSE 
         
D base increasing, t-1 -0.010 -0.015 -0.013 -0.011 -0.004 -0.007 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.023) (0.021) (0.022) (0.019) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
D base decreasing, t-1 -0.004 0.016 0.020* 0.017 0.003 0.009 0.007 0.006 
 (0.020) (0.014) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) 
D rate increasing, t-1 -0.039** -0.036** -0.045** -0.043** -0.029* -0.028* -0.034*** -0.025** 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.019) (0.016) (0.016) (0.013) (0.012) 
D rate decreasing, t-1 -0.026 -0.011 -0.015 -0.009 -0.005 0.004 0.000 0.006 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.022) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) 
Population (log), t-1   0.452 0.944   0.033*** 0.038*** 
   (0.338) (0.565)   (0.009) (0.011) 
Debt (% GDP), t-1   0.114 0.168   0.004 0.012 
   (0.120) (0.156)   (0.021) (0.020) 
Primary balance, t-1   1.607*** 1.821***   1.174*** 1.089*** 
   (0.245) (0.265)   (0.267) (0.345) 
Internet users (log), t-1   0.116 0.242*   0.212*** 0.333*** 
   (0.121) (0.130)   (0.061) (0.081) 
Tourism revenues (% 
exports), t-1 
  0.237 -0.264   -0.789*** -0.423 
   (1.001) (1.078)   (0.228) (0.318) 
Left political 
orientation, t-1 
  0.018 0.028   -0.012 -0.010 
   (0.022) (0.026)   (0.019) (0.018) 
         
Country effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
Time effects  No   Yes  No   Yes  No   Yes  No   Yes  
         
Observations 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 
R-squared 0.825 0.854 0.895 0.904 0.598 0.684 0.792 0.839 
Note: dependent variable is the logarithm of the input efficiency score using DEA-based Model 2 – refer to main text for details. 
Country and time effects omitted for reasons of parsimony. Constant term estimated but omitted. Robust standard errors 





Table 4. Baseline Estimation by Tax type: OLS and PCSE, Model 2 
 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Estimator  OLS PCSE OLS PCSE OLS PCSE 
       
Population (log), t-1 0.992* 0.052*** 0.840 0.054*** 0.799 0.054*** 
 (0.572) (0.012) (0.555) (0.011) (0.586) (0.009) 
Debt (% GDP), t-1 0.171 -0.083*** 0.149 -0.095*** 0.156 -0.100*** 
 (0.150) (0.031) (0.156) (0.028) (0.163) (0.025) 
Primary balance, t-1 1.828*** 1.003*** 1.830*** 0.931*** 1.781*** 0.904** 
 (0.269) (0.345) (0.319) (0.347) (0.264) (0.377) 
Internet users (log), t-1 0.253* 0.315*** 0.229* 0.328*** 0.229* 0.328*** 
 (0.128) (0.064) (0.128) (0.061) (0.134) (0.059) 
Tourism revenues (% exports), t-1 -0.379 0.048 -0.043 0.093 -0.179 0.080 
 (1.145) (0.278) (1.169) (0.248) (0.996) (0.249) 
Left political orientation, t-1 0.033 -0.023 0.025 -0.034 0.027 -0.041 
 (0.027) (0.023) (0.027) (0.024) (0.027) (0.026) 
D base increasing PIT, t-1 -0.019 -0.008     
 (0.019) (0.013)     
D base decreasing PIT, t-1 0.000 0.000     
 (0.015) (0.012)     
D rate increasing PIT, t-1 -0.048* -0.024     
 (0.024) (0.019)     
D rate decreasing PIT, t-1 0.005 -0.006     
 (0.027) (0.019)     
D base increasing CIT, t-1   -0.021 -0.012   
   (0.025) (0.019)   
D base decreasing CIT, t-1   0.011 -0.001   
   (0.018) (0.015)   
D rate increasing CIT, t-1   -0.017 -0.007   
   (0.024) (0.019)   
D rate decreasing CIT, t-1   -0.014 -0.000   
   (0.029) (0.022)   
D base increasing VAT, t-1     0.030 0.003 
     (0.028) (0.030) 
D base decreasing VAT, t-1     0.104* 0.077* 
     (0.058) (0.040) 
D rate increasing VAT, t-1     -0.030** -0.021 
     (0.014) (0.021) 
D rate decreasing VAT, t-1     -0.026 0.006 
     (0.018) (0.026) 
       
Country effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Time effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
       
Observations 180 180 180 180 180 180 
R-squared 0.903 0.423 0.900 0.411 0.904 0.409 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the efficiency score using DEA-based Model 2 – refer to main text for details. 
Country and time effects omitted for reasons of parsimony. Constant term estimated but omitted. Robust standard errors 







Table 5. Sensitivity Estimation: Simar-Wilson, Model 2 
 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Estimator  Simar Wilson 
     
Population (log), t-1 0.267 0.288 0.164 0.092 
 (0.201) (0.206) (0.205) (0.185) 
Debt (% GDP), t-1 0.109*** 0.115*** 0.093** 0.084** 
 (0.036) (0.037) (0.038) (0.034) 
Primary balance, t-1 0.577*** 0.561*** 0.576*** 0.542*** 
 (0.145) (0.143) (0.143) (0.129) 
Internet users (log), t-1 0.057 0.059 0.043 0.020 
 (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.055) 
Tourism revenues (% exports), t-1 -0.474 -0.400 -0.276 -0.207 
 (0.439) (0.443) (0.469) (0.424) 
Left political orientation, t-1 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 -0.007 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
D base increasing, t-1 -0.003    
 (0.008)    
D base decreasing, t-1 0.015*    
 (0.008)    
D rate increasing, t-1 -0.027***    
 (0.009)    
D rate  decreasing, t-1 0.010    
 (0.009)    
D base increasing PIT, t-1  -0.014   
  (0.009)   
D base decreasing PIT, t-1  0.003   
  (0.009)   
D rate increasing PIT, t-1  -0.024**   
  (0.012)   
D rate decreasing PIT, t-1  0.027**   
  (0.012)   
D base increasing CIT, t-1   0.002  
   (0.011)  
D base decreasing CIT, t-1   0.002  
   (0.010)  
D rate increasing CIT, t-1   -0.007  
   (0.014)  
D rate decreasing CIT, t-1   0.002  
   (0.015)  
D base increasing VAT, t-1    -0.001 
    (0.019) 
D base decreasing VAT, t-1    0.187*** 
    (0.040) 
D rate increasing VAT, t-1    -0.013 
    (0.012) 
D rate decreasing VAT, t-1    0.012 
    (0.015) 
     
Observations 180 180 180 180 
Note: dependent variable is the level of the efficiency score using DEA-based Model 2 – refer to main text for details. Country 
and time effects omitted for reasons of parsimony. Constant term estimated but omitted. Standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, 





Table 6. Robustness Estimation: Endogeneity Difference GMM, Model 2 
 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Estimator  difference GMM 
     
Lagged dependent variable 0.464*** 0.489*** 0.485*** 0.508*** 
 (0.066) (0.083) (0.083) (0.092) 
Population (log), t-1 -0.042 -0.040 -0.380 0.163 
 (0.427) (0.377) (0.430) (0.309) 
Debt (% GDP), t-1 0.159** 0.145* 0.138* -0.042 
 (0.057) (0.070) (0.072) (0.080) 
Primary balance, t-1 0.920*** 0.842*** 0.843*** 1.017*** 
 (0.165) (0.164) (0.180) (0.339) 
Internet users (log), t-1 0.144 0.108 0.195* 0.131 
 (0.106) (0.095) (0.097) (0.102) 
Tourism revenues (% exports), t-1 -0.942 -0.925 -0.399 0.040 
 (0.561) (0.633) (0.480) (0.701) 
Left political orientation, t-1 0.024 0.031* 0.030 0.029 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.024) 
D base increasing, t-1 0.025*    
 (0.014)    
D base decreasing, t-1 0.011    
 (0.010)    
D rate increasing, t-1 -0.038***    
 (0.013)    
D rate  decreasing, t-1 0.023    
 (0.014)    
D base increasing PIT, t-1  0.022   
  (0.014)   
D base decreasing PIT, t-1  -0.005   
  (0.015)   
D rate increasing PIT, t-1  -0.044***   
  (0.012)   
D rate decreasing PIT, t-1  0.024   
  (0.042)   
D base increasing CIT, t-1   0.015  
   (0.016)  
D base decreasing CIT, t-1   -0.005  
   (0.012)  
D rate increasing CIT, t-1   -0.022  
   (0.014)  
D rate decreasing CIT, t-1   -0.011  
   (0.015)  
D base increasing VAT, t-1    0.021 
    (0.015) 
D base decreasing VAT, t-1    0.164 
    (0.103) 
D rate increasing VAT, t-1    0.011 
    (0.020) 
D rate decreasing VAT, t-1    -0.000 
    (0.056) 
     
Observations 144 144 144 144 
Hansen (p-value)  0.323 0.122 0.336 0.961 
AR2 (p-value) 0.490 0.143 0.156 0.257 
AR1 (p-value) 0.019 0.017 0.014 0.024 
Note:  dependent variable is the level of the efficiency score using DEA-based Model 2 – refer to main text for details. Hansen 
test evaluates the validity of the instrument set, i.e., tests for over-identifying restrictions. AR(1) and AR(2) are 
the Arellano–Bond autocorrelation tests of first and second order (the null is no autocorrelation), respectively.  
Country and time effects omitted for reasons of parsimony. Standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical 






Table 7. Robustness Estimation: Dynamic Estimator LSDV-C, Model 2 
 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Estimator  LSDV-C 
     
Lagged dependent variable 0.522*** 0.515*** 0.543*** 0.506*** 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.054) 
Population (log), t-1 0.279 0.281 0.230 0.276 
 (0.264) (0.259) (0.272) (0.252) 
Debt (% GDP), t-1 0.214*** 0.216*** 0.211*** 0.213*** 
 (0.050) (0.046) (0.048) (0.048) 
Primary balance, t-1 0.729*** 0.724*** 0.682*** 0.761*** 
 (0.158) (0.153) (0.160) (0.158) 
Internet users (log), t-1 0.010 0.005 -0.017 -0.008 
 (0.072) (0.066) (0.067) (0.071) 
Tourism revenues (% exports), t-1 -0.824 -0.862* -0.744 -0.704 
 (0.528) (0.506) (0.557) (0.559) 
Left political orientation, t-1 0.004 0.007 0.005 0.007 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) 
D base increasing, t-1 0.010    
 (0.012)    
D base decreasing, t-1 0.012    
 (0.012)    
D rate increasing, t-1 -0.035***    
 (0.011)    
D rate  decreasing, t-1 0.009    
 (0.015)    
D base increasing PIT, t-1  0.012   
  (0.013)   
D base decreasing PIT, t-1  0.002   
  (0.011)   
D rate increasing PIT, t-1  -0.047***   
  (0.015)   
D rate decreasing PIT, t-1  0.008   
  (0.015)   
D base increasing CIT, t-1   -0.011  
   (0.020)  
D base decreasing CIT, t-1   -0.008  
   (0.013)  
D rate increasing CIT, t-1   -0.014  
   (0.022)  
D rate decreasing CIT, t-1   0.005  
   (0.019)  
D base increasing VAT, t-1    0.006 
    (0.034) 
D base decreasing VAT, t-1    0.107*** 
    (0.036) 
D rate increasing VAT, t-1    -0.022* 
    (0.014) 
D rate decreasing VAT, t-1    -0.002 
    (0.026) 
     
Observations 162 162 162 162 
Note:  dependent variable is the level of the efficiency score using DEA-based Model 2 – refer to main text for details. Country 
and time effects omitted for reasons of parsimony. Constant term estimated but omitted. Standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, 






Table 8. Robustness Estimation: State-contingent, Model 2 
 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) 




     
Lagged dependent variable 0.519*** 0.470*** 0.421*** 0.469*** 
 (0.078) (0.084) (0.094) (0.142) 
Population (log), t-1 -0.068 -0.113 -0.072 0.215 
 (0.345) (0.396) (0.408) (0.244) 
Debt (% GDP), t-1 0.158*** 0.130 0.190*** 0.178*** 
 (0.051) (0.086) (0.050) (0.050) 
Primary balance, t-1 0.971*** 1.115*** 1.119*** 1.175*** 
 (0.144) (0.111) (0.195) (0.200) 
Internet users (log), t-1 0.040 0.073 0.020 0.120 
 (0.092) (0.086) (0.090) (0.094) 
Tourism revenues (% exports), t-1 -0.007 -0.761 -0.268 0.429 
 (0.469) (0.502) (0.565) (0.482) 
Left political orientation, t-1 0.022 0.039* 0.036* 0.028* 
 (0.015) (0.020) (0.021) (0.014) 
D base increasing, t-1*recession -0.022    
 (0.023)    
D base increasing, t-1*expansion 0.063**    
 (0.024)    
D base decreasing, t-1*recession 0.001    
 (0.024)    
D base decreasing, t-1*expansion 0.021    
 (0.024)    
D rate increasing, t-1*recession -0.001    
 (0.025)    
D rate increasing, t-1*expansion -0.072*    
 (0.035)    
D rate decreasing, t-1*recession -0.015    
 (0.023)    
D rate decreasing, t-1*expansion 0.039    
 (0.038)    
D base increasing PIT, t-1 *recession  0.038*   
  (0.019)   
D base increasing PIT, t-1 *expansion  0.004   
  (0.035)   
D base decreasing PIT, t-1 *recession  0.010   
  (0.022)   
D base decreasing PIT, t-1*expansion  -0.024   
  (0.042)   
D rate increasing PIT, t-1 *recession  -0.052   
  (0.033)   
D rate increasing PIT, t-1*expansion  -0.039   
  (0.036)   
D rate decreasing PIT, t-1*recession  -0.145*   
  (0.077)   
D rate decreasing PIT, t-1*expansion  0.219**   
  (0.103)   
D base increasing CIT, t-1 *recession   -0.087**  
   (0.035)  
D base increasing CIT, t-1 *expansion   0.126***  
   (0.043)  
D base decreasing CIT, t-1*recession   -0.031  
   (0.025)  
D base decreasing CIT, t-1*expansion   0.017  
   (0.031)  
D rate increasing CIT, t-1*recession   0.054**  
   (0.019)  
D rate increasing CIT, t-1*expansion   -0.058**  
   (0.027)  
D rate decreasing CIT, t-1t*recession   -0.009  
   (0.023)  
D rate decreasing CIT, t-1*expansion   0.023  
   (0.030)  
D base increasing VAT, t-1 *recession    0.051** 
    (0.020) 
D base increasing VAT, t-1 *expansion    -0.010 
    (0.026) 
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D base decreasing VAT, t-1*recession    0.000 
    (0.000) 
D base decreasing VAT, t-1*expansion    0.317*** 
    (0.015) 
D rate increasing VAT, t-1*recession    0.039* 
    (0.022) 
D rate increasing VAT, t-1*expansion    -0.044 
    (0.037) 
D rate decreasing VAT, t-1*recession    -0.009 
    (0.015) 
D rate decreasing VAT, t-1*expansion    0.099 
    (0.074) 
     
Observations 144 144 144 144 
Hansen (p-value)  0.626 0.865 0.398 0.992 
AR2 (p-value) 0.401 0.680   
AR1 (p-value) 0.012 0.018  0.088 
 
Note: dependent variable is the level of the efficiency score using DEA-based Model 2 – refer to main text for details. Hansen 
test evaluates the validity of the instrument set, i.e., tests for over-identifying restrictions. AR(1) and AR(2) are 
the Arellano–Bond autocorrelation tests of first and second order (the null is no autocorrelation), respectively. 
Country and time effects omitted for reasons of parsimony. Constant term estimated but omitted. Standard errors in parenthesis. 






Appendix A  
 
Table A1: DEA Output Components 
 
Sub Index  Variable  Source  Series 
Opportunity 
Indicators 
      
Administration  Corruption  Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 
(2006- 2017) 
Corruption on a scale from 10 (Perceived to have low levels 
of corruption) to 0 (highly corrupt), 2006-2011; Corruption 
on a scale from 100 (Perceived to have low levels of 
corruption) to 0 (highly corrupt), 2012-2017.  
Red Tape  World Economic Forum:  The 
Global competitiveness Report 
(2006-2017) 
Burden of government regulation on a scale from 7 (not 




World Economic Forum:  The 
Global competitiveness Report 
(2006-2017) 
Judicial independence on a scale from 7 (entirely 
independent) to 1 (heavily influenced). 
 
Property Rights  World Economic Forum:  The 
Global competitiveness Report 
(2006-2017) 
Property rights on a scale from 7 (very strong) to 1 (very 
weak). 
  Shadow Economy Schneider (2016) (2006-2016)14 Shadow economy measured as percentage of official GDP. 
Reciprocal value 1/x.  
Education Secondary School 
Enrolment  
World Bank, World Development 
Indicators (2006-2017) 





World Economic Forum:  The 
Global competitiveness Report 
(2006-2017) 
Quality of educational system on a scale from 7 (very well) 
to 1 (not well at all). 
  PISA scores PISA Report (2003, 2006, 2009, 
2012, 2015) 
Simple average of mathematics, reading and science scores 
for the years 2015, 2012, 2009; Simple average of 
mathematics and reading for the year 2003. For the missing 
years, we assumed that the scores were the same as in the 
previous years. 
Health Infant Survival 
Rate 
World Bank, World Development 
Indicators (2006-2017) 
Infant survival rate = (1000-IMR)/1000. IMR is the infant 
mortality rate measured per 1000 lives birth in a given year.  
Life Expectancy  World Bank, World Development 
Indicators (2006-2017) 
Life expectancy at birth, measured in years. 
  CVD, cancer, 
diabetes or CRD 
Survival Rate 
World Health Organization, Global 
Health Observatory Data 
Repository (2000, 2005, 2010, 
2015, 2016) 
CVD, cancer and diabetes survival rate =100-M. M is the 
mortality rate between the ages 30 and 70. For the missing 






World Economic Forum:  The 
Global competitiveness Report 
(2006-2017) 
Infrastructure quality on a scale from 7 (extensive and 
efficient) to 1 (extremely underdeveloped) 
 
Standard Musgravian Indicators  
  
Distribution  Gini Index  Eurostat, OECD (2006-2016)15 Gini index on a scale from 1(perfect inequality) to 0 (perfect 
equality). Transformed to 1-Gini. 
Stabilization  Coefficient of 
Variation of 
Growth  
IMF World Economic Outlook 
(WEO database) (2006-2017) 
Coefficient of variation=standard deviation/mean of GDP 
growth based on 5 year data. GDP constant prices (percent 
change). Reciprocal value 1/x. 
  Standard 
Deviation of 
Inflation 
IMF World Economic Outlook 
(WEO database) (2006-2017) 
Standard deviation of inflation based on 5-year consumer 
prices (percent change) data. Reciprocal value 1/x.  
Economic 
Performance 
GDP per Capita IMF World Economic Outlook 
(WEO database) (2006-2017) 
GDP per capita based on PPP, current international dollar. 
 
GDP Growth  IMF World Economic Outlook 
(WEO database) (2006-2017) 
GDP constant prices (percent change). 
  Unemployment  IMF World Economic Outlook 
(WEO database) (2006-2017) 
Unemployment rate, as a percentage of total labor force. 
Reciprocal value 1/x. 
  
                                                          
14 For Chile, Iceland, Israel, South Korea and Mexico, we use the data available in Medina and Schneider (2017). 
15 For Switzerland, we were only able to collect data for the period between 2009 and 2016. 
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Table A2: Input Components 
 
Sub Index  Variable  Source  Series 
Opportunity 




IMF World Economic Outlook 
(WEO database) (2005-2016) 
General government final 
consumption expenditure (% of 




UNESCO Institute for Statistics 
(2005-2016)16 




Expenditure OECD database (2005-2016) 






European Commission, AMECO 
(2005-2016)17 
General  government gross fixed 




Indicators       
Distribution  
Social Protection 
Expenditure OECD database (2005-2016)18 
Aggregation of the social 





Expenditure OECD database (2005-2016)19 
Expenditure total expenditure (% 
of GDP)  
                                                          
16 From IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO database), we retrieved data for Greece for the period between 2006 
and 2012 and for the USA for the period 2005 and 2007. 
17 We were not able to collect data on the following countries: Australia, Canada, Mexico, New Zealand, Chile,  
Israel and South Korea. 
18 From IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO database), we retrieved data for New Zealand for the period 2005 
and 2012. For Turkey, we retrieve data from European Commission, AMECO database. For Chile and Iceland, 
we were only able to collect data for the period between 2013 and 2016. For Turkey, we were only able to get data 
for the period between 2009 and 2015. We were not able to collect data for Canada.  
19 From IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO database), we retrieved data for Canada for the period between 
2005 and 2012 and for New Zealand for the period 2009 and 2012. For Turkey, we retrieve data from European 
Commission, AMECO database. We were not able to collect data for Mexico. For Chile and Iceland, we were only 
able to collect data for the period between 2013 and 2016. For New Zealand, we were only able to collect data for 




Table A3 – Second-stage regression variables´ definition and source 
 
Variable Definition Source 
D base decreasing, t-1 
Dummy variable equalling one if a country reduced the tax base of 
PIT, CIT or VAT in the previous year and zero otherwise. 
Amaglobeli 
et al. (2018) 
D base increasing , t-1 
Dummy variable equalling one if a country increased the tax base 
of PIT, CIT or VAT in the previous year and zero otherwise. 
D rate  decreasing, t-1 
Dummy variable equalling one if a country reduced the tax rate of 
PIT, CIT or VAT in the previous year and zero otherwise. 
D rate increasing, t-1 
Dummy variable equalling one if a country increased the tax rate of 
PIT, CIT or VAT in the previous year and zero otherwise. 
D base decreasing PIT, t-1 
Dummy variable equalling one if a country reduced the tax base of 
PIT in the previous year and zero otherwise. 
D base increasing PIT, t-1 
Dummy variable equalling one if a country increased the tax base 
of PIT in the previous year and zero otherwise. 
D rate  decreasing PIT, t-1 
Dummy variable equalling one if a country reduced the tax rate of 
PIT in the previous year and zero otherwise. 
D rate increasing PIT, t-1 
Dummy variable equalling one if a country increased the tax rate of 
PIT in the previous year and zero otherwise. 
D base decreasing CIT, t-1 
Dummy variable equalling one if a country reduced the tax base of 
CIT in the previous year and zero otherwise. 
D base increasing CIT, t-1 
Dummy variable equalling one if a country increased the tax base 
of CIT in the previous year and zero otherwise. 
D rate  decreasing CIT, t-1 
Dummy variable equalling one if a country reduced the tax rate of 
CIT in the previous year and zero otherwise. 
D rate increasing CIT, t-1 
Dummy variable equalling one if a country increased the tax rate of 
CIT in the previous year and zero otherwise. 
D base decreasing VAT, t-1 
Dummy variable equalling one if a country reduced the tax base of 
VAT in the previous year and zero otherwise. 
D base increasing VAT, t-1 
Dummy variable equalling one if a country increased the tax base 
of VAT in the previous year and zero otherwise. 
D rate  decreasing VAT, t-1 
Dummy variable equalling one if a country reduced the tax rate of 
VAT in the previous year and zero otherwise. 
D rate increasing VAT, t-1 
Dummy variable equalling one if a country increased the tax rate of 
VAT in the previous year and zero otherwise. 
Population (log), t-1 





Internet users, t-1 





Tourism revenues (% exports), 
t-1 





Primary balance, t-1 
Government net borrowing or net lending, excluding interest 
payments on consolidated government liabilities (OCDE, 2011). 
IMF WEO 
Debt (%GDP), t-1 Share of public debt in GDP in the previous year. IMF WEO 
Left political orientation, t-1  
Dummy variable equal one if the government is from the left 









Appendix B  
 
Table B.1: Input-oriented DEA VRS Efficiency Scores Model 0 
 
 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
AUS 0.88 0.77 0.80 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.93 0.76 0.75 0.76 
AUT 0.62 0.52 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.51 0.51 0.54 0.54 
BEL 0.47 0.50 0.49 0.51 0.50 0.49 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.50 0.53 0.54 
CAN 0.80 0.64 0.77 0.61 0.58 0.55 0.56 0.57 0.82 0.66 0.65 0.65 
CHE 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.81 0.72 0.69 0.66 0.67 1.00 0.84 0.73 0.71 
CHL 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
CZE 0.54 0.55 0.57 0.61 0.57 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.61 0.64 0.66 0.72 
DEU 0.47 0.49 0.50 0.55 0.52 0.51 0.52 0.53 0.60 0.58 0.60 0.59 
DNK 0.53 0.46 0.41 0.46 0.42 0.41 0.40 0.41 0.44 0.45 0.48 0.48 
ESP 0.93 0.77 0.55 0.57 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.55 0.58 0.61 0.64 0.67 
EST 0.64 0.65 0.62 0.58 0.53 0.58 0.61 0.58 0.62 0.65 0.66 0.65 
FIN 0.52 0.51 0.46 0.51 0.46 0.45 0.44 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.46 0.46 
FRA 0.60 0.44 0.41 0.45 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.45 0.45 0.48 0.47 
GBR 0.79 0.64 0.56 0.58 0.55 0.53 0.54 0.54 0.65 0.61 0.63 0.64 
GRC 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.55 0.56 0.57 
HUN 0.49 0.43 0.47 0.53 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.56 0.57 0.65 
IRL 0.66 0.63 0.56 0.52 0.51 0.45 0.53 0.57 0.71 1.00 0.91 0.92 
ISL 0.61 0.65 0.52 0.54 0.58 0.58 0.59 0.59 0.62 0.64 0.69 0.62 
ISR 0.55 0.55 0.58 0.64 0.68 0.67 0.68 0.75 0.69 0.70 0.74 0.75 
ITA 0.49 0.48 0.50 0.52 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.51 0.52 0.54 0.57 0.58 
JPN 0.64 0.90 0.60 0.64 0.60 0.59 0.55 0.55 0.58 0.60 0.64 0.63 
KOR 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
LTU 0.66 0.65 0.60 0.61 0.56 0.57 0.59 0.66 0.71 0.75 0.79 0.80 
LUX 0.70 0.73 0.54 0.58 0.54 0.52 0.54 0.54 0.73 0.63 0.64 0.63 
LVA 0.68 0.65 0.65 0.66 0.60 0.58 0.62 0.62 0.64 0.69 0.72 0.74 
NLD 0.52 0.59 0.79 0.67 0.54 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.54 0.56 0.59 0.60 
NOR 0.54 0.54 0.50 0.58 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.62 0.53 0.51 0.48 
NZL 0.59 0.55 0.54 0.61 0.59 0.56 0.50 0.65 0.78 0.66 0.69 0.70 
POL 0.51 0.49 0.52 0.56 0.58 0.63 0.60 0.57 0.59 0.60 0.64 0.65 
PRT 0.48 0.50 0.52 0.54 0.52 0.48 0.51 0.54 0.54 0.56 0.61 0.64 
SVK 0.57 0.58 0.67 0.67 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.59 0.66 
SVN 0.49 0.49 0.54 0.55 0.52 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.48 0.53 0.58 0.62 
SWE 0.46 0.44 0.43 0.48 0.47 0.46 0.45 0.43 0.46 0.48 0.50 0.49 
TUR 0.67 0.66 0.69 0.74 0.76 0.79 0.82 0.78 0.83 0.84 0.88 0.87 
USA 0.72 0.67 0.60 0.62 0.60 0.60 0.61 0.63 0.93 0.66 0.68 0.66 
Count 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 2 2 
Average 0.64 0.62 0.60 0.61 0.59 0.58 0.58 0.59 0.65 0.64 0.65 0.66 
Median 0.60 0.58 0.55 0.58 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.62 0.61 0.64 0.65 
Min 0.46 0.43 0.41 0.45 0.42 0.41 0.40 0.41 0.43 0.43 0.46 0.46 
Max 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 





Table B.2: Input-oriented DEA VRS Efficiency Scores Model 1 
 
 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
AUS 0.94 0.81 0.85 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.77 0.75 0.76 
AUT 0.72 0.63 0.58 0.60 0.60 0.59 0.59 0.61 0.62 0.64 0.66 0.64 
BEL 0.55 0.59 0.56 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.58 0.58 0.60 0.62 0.64 0.64 
CAN 0.81 0.66 0.77 0.65 0.63 0.61 0.61 0.63 0.83 0.69 0.68 0.68 
CHE 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.83 0.75 0.74 0.72 0.71 1.00 0.86 0.75 0.73 
CHL 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
CZE 0.55 0.55 0.59 0.66 0.61 0.64 0.64 0.66 0.70 0.71 0.69 0.78 
DEU 0.60 0.62 0.61 0.69 0.64 0.63 0.63 0.65 0.70 0.69 0.70 0.69 
DNK 0.60 0.53 0.47 0.54 0.51 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.53 0.55 0.53 
ESP 0.94 0.79 0.57 0.63 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.70 0.76 0.80 0.79 0.83 
EST 0.65 0.68 0.67 0.59 0.58 0.65 0.66 0.60 0.65 0.68 0.67 0.67 
FIN 0.60 0.61 0.54 0.61 0.58 0.57 0.55 0.53 0.54 0.55 0.57 0.56 
FRA 0.67 0.52 0.48 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.55 0.57 0.60 0.57 
GBR 0.92 0.72 0.63 0.68 0.67 0.64 0.63 0.66 0.72 0.69 0.71 0.70 
GRC 0.57 0.53 0.56 0.60 0.59 0.65 0.68 0.69 0.69 0.73 0.73 0.72 
HUN 0.55 0.47 0.54 0.68 0.70 0.68 0.67 0.68 0.68 0.64 0.61 0.76 
IRL 0.67 0.64 0.56 0.56 0.59 0.54 0.62 0.67 0.79 1.00 0.96 0.94 
ISL 0.67 0.72 0.57 0.60 0.58 0.59 0.62 0.61 0.63 0.64 0.71 0.64 
ISR 0.58 0.55 0.59 0.68 0.73 0.72 0.72 0.78 0.73 0.75 0.77 0.78 
ITA 0.59 0.55 0.60 0.66 0.65 0.67 0.67 0.69 0.72 0.75 0.77 0.77 
JPN 0.67 0.94 0.65 0.74 0.71 0.69 0.63 0.64 0.65 0.67 0.70 0.68 
KOR 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
LTU 0.68 0.66 0.62 0.65 0.65 0.64 0.65 0.74 0.79 0.84 0.84 0.86 
LUX 0.74 0.81 0.60 0.67 0.63 0.62 0.64 0.68 0.87 0.77 0.78 0.75 
LVA 0.70 0.67 0.72 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.68 0.65 0.68 0.75 0.76 0.80 
NLD 0.56 0.61 0.79 0.70 0.58 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.59 0.62 0.64 0.63 
NOR 0.57 0.58 0.51 0.61 0.55 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.64 0.55 0.53 0.50 
NZL 0.62 0.56 0.57 0.62 0.60 0.56 0.54 0.67 0.82 0.68 0.73 0.71 
POL 0.61 0.56 0.60 0.64 0.66 0.72 0.66 0.66 0.70 0.70 0.73 0.77 
PRT 0.52 0.53 0.57 0.63 0.61 0.55 0.61 0.69 0.72 0.75 0.77 0.81 
SVK 0.66 0.63 0.77 0.77 0.71 0.72 0.70 0.74 0.75 0.73 0.62 0.75 
SVN 0.56 0.54 0.59 0.62 0.60 0.59 0.60 0.61 0.59 0.61 0.66 0.72 
SWE 0.53 0.52 0.49 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.51 0.48 0.50 0.52 0.54 0.52 
TUR 0.88 0.80 0.84 0.95 0.93 0.98 1.00 0.89 0.93 0.97 0.99 0.97 
USA 0.87 0.79 0.73 0.69 0.60 0.61 0.61 0.64 1.00 0.82 0.81 0.79 
Count 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 4 3 2 2 
Average 0.70 0.67 0.65 0.68 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.68 0.73 0.72 0.73 0.73 
Median 0.66 0.63 0.60 0.65 0.61 0.63 0.63 0.66 0.70 0.70 0.71 0.73 
Min 0.52 0.47 0.47 0.54 0.51 0.50 0.49 0.48 0.50 0.52 0.53 0.50 
Max 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 





Table B.3: Input-oriented DEA VRS Efficiency Scores Model 2 
 
 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
AUS 0.98 0.89 0.86 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.88 0.85 0.86 
AUT 0.67 0.63 0.65 0.64 0.62 0.61 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.61 0.62 
BEL 0.61 0.58 0.59 0.58 0.55 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.57 0.58 0.59 0.59 
CAN 0.80 0.74 0.78 0.76 0.73 0.71 0.73 0.74 0.84 0.79 0.74 0.75 
CHE 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
CHL 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
CZE 0.54 0.56 0.58 0.61 0.57 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.61 0.64 0.66 0.72 
DEU 0.68 0.65 0.67 0.67 0.63 0.62 0.66 0.69 0.70 0.72 0.68 0.70 
DNK 0.65 0.61 0.58 0.59 0.55 0.55 0.51 0.51 0.54 0.56 0.56 0.57 
ESP 1.00 1.00 0.57 0.57 0.54 0.53 0.55 0.59 0.62 0.66 0.67 0.69 
EST 0.65 0.65 0.62 0.59 0.53 0.59 0.62 0.61 0.67 0.71 0.69 0.70 
FIN 0.72 0.69 0.69 0.67 0.62 0.63 0.64 0.63 0.61 0.59 0.61 0.62 
FRA 0.60 0.53 0.53 0.54 0.53 0.52 0.52 0.53 0.53 0.54 0.52 0.52 
GBR 0.79 0.68 0.64 0.64 0.62 0.62 0.65 0.67 0.70 0.72 0.72 0.74 
GRC 0.51 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.55 0.56 0.57 
HUN 0.57 0.43 0.47 0.53 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.56 0.57 0.66 
IRL 0.75 0.63 0.59 0.56 0.54 0.49 0.65 0.71 0.77 1.00 1.00 1.00 
ISL 0.83 0.73 0.70 0.70 0.77 0.76 0.78 0.76 0.77 0.78 0.80 0.72 
ISR 0.61 0.56 0.58 0.64 0.68 0.67 0.68 0.76 0.70 0.70 0.76 0.77 
ITA 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.52 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.51 0.52 0.54 0.57 0.58 
JPN 0.87 1.00 0.78 0.78 0.74 0.74 0.69 0.72 0.76 0.77 0.76 0.77 
KOR 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
LTU 0.66 0.67 0.60 0.61 0.56 0.57 0.59 0.66 0.72 0.75 0.79 0.80 
LUX 0.71 0.81 0.69 0.71 0.67 0.66 0.71 0.72 0.76 0.78 0.74 0.75 
LVA 0.68 0.67 0.65 0.66 0.60 0.58 0.62 0.62 0.64 0.69 0.72 0.74 
NLD 0.78 0.70 1.00 0.74 0.67 0.67 0.71 0.72 0.75 0.76 0.76 0.79 
NOR 0.66 0.61 0.58 0.65 0.57 0.57 0.59 0.62 0.64 0.62 0.55 0.55 
NZL 0.75 0.63 0.63 0.72 0.71 0.69 0.65 0.80 0.81 0.83 0.82 0.83 
POL 0.51 0.50 0.59 0.57 0.59 0.74 0.63 0.58 0.59 0.60 0.64 0.65 
PRT 0.50 0.51 0.53 0.54 0.52 0.48 0.52 0.57 0.60 0.63 0.63 0.68 
SVK 0.57 0.59 1.00 0.67 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.61 0.62 0.63 0.59 0.66 
SVN 0.49 0.50 0.55 0.55 0.52 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.48 0.53 0.58 0.62 
SWE 0.55 0.54 0.56 0.59 0.60 0.60 0.56 0.54 0.54 0.56 0.58 0.59 
TUR 0.67 0.66 0.69 0.74 0.76 0.80 0.82 0.80 0.84 0.85 0.88 0.87 
USA 0.92 0.81 0.79 0.75 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.80 0.97 0.81 0.80 0.84 
Count 3 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 
Average 0.71 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.65 0.65 0.66 0.68 0.70 0.71 0.71 0.73 
Median 0.67 0.65 0.63 0.64 0.60 0.61 0.63 0.63 0.67 0.70 0.69 0.72 
Min 0.49 0.43 0.47 0.50 0.49 0.48 0.50 0.50 0.48 0.53 0.52 0.52 
Max 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 





Appendix C  
 
Table C.1. Baseline Estimation Alternative Dependent Variables: OLS and PCSE, 
Models 0 and 1 
 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Model 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Estimator OLS OLS PCSE PCSE OLS OLS PCSE PCSE 
         
D base increasing, t-1 -0.016 -0.011 -0.013 -0.008 -0.013 -0.004 -0.017 -0.016 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.014) (0.013) (0.020) (0.017) (0.015) (0.014) 
D base decreasing, t-1 0.035* 0.030 0.027** 0.019* 0.020 0.014 0.021* 0.018* 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.013) (0.012) (0.024) (0.021) (0.012) (0.011) 
D rate increasing, t-1 -0.042* -0.050* -0.039** -0.030** -0.039 -0.051** -0.026* -0.023* 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.016) (0.014) (0.026) (0.023) (0.016) (0.014) 
D rate  decreasing, t-1 -0.011 -0.005 0.010 0.011 -0.009 -0.007 0.001 0.003 
 (0.021) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.021) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) 
Population (log), t-1  0.723  0.032***  0.306  0.025*** 
  (0.554)  (0.006)  (0.556)  (0.006) 
Debt (% GDP), t-1  0.074  -0.043  0.202**  -0.026 
  (0.134)  (0.027)  (0.086)  (0.022) 
Primary balance, t-1  1.697***  0.835**  1.499***  0.847*** 
  (0.283)  (0.379)  (0.303)  (0.288) 
Internet users (log), t-1  0.226**  0.147*  0.312***  0.139** 
  (0.106)  (0.090)  (0.079)  (0.069) 
Tourism revenues (% 
exports), t-1 
 -1.326  -0.320  -2.336**  0.331** 
  (1.094)  (0.210)  (0.843)  (0.140) 
Left political orientation, t-1  0.061  0.012  0.033  -0.034** 
  (0.037)  (0.020)  (0.035)  (0.017) 
         
Country effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Time effects  No  Yes  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes  
         
Observations 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 
R-squared 0.861 0.897 0.810 0.811 0.804 0.866 0.733 0.744 
 
Note: dependent variable is the logarithm of the efficiency score using DEA-based Model 0 or Model 1 – refer to main text for 
details. Country and time effects omitted for reasons of parsimony. Constant term estimated but omitted. Robust standard errors 





Table C.2. Robustness Estimation: Expected values of future real GDP growth. 
 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Estimator  OLS OLS PCSE PCSE 
     
D base increasing, t-1 -0.012 -0.008 -0.012 -0.012 
 (0.019) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013) 
D base decreasing, t-1 0.024* 0.021 0.016 0.015 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.011) (0.012) 
D rate increasing, t-1 -0.033** -0.033* -0.026* -0.020 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) 
D rate decreasing, t-1 -0.014 -0.012 -0.004 0.000 
 (0.022) (0.017) (0.014) (0.014) 
Population (log), t-1 0.330 0.729 0.039*** 0.034*** 
 (0.318) (0.510) (0.008) (0.009) 
Debt (% GDP), t-1 0.056 0.110 0.011 0.037* 
 (0.092) (0.120) (0.022) (0.023) 
Primary balance, t-1 1.485*** 1.622*** 1.310*** 1.114*** 
 (0.213) (0.235) (0.234) (0.319) 
Internet users (log), t-1 0.162 0.241* 0.195*** 0.224*** 
 (0.107) (0.118) (0.054) (0.081) 
Tourism revenues (% 
exports), t-1 
-0.227 -0.235 -0.642*** -0.609* 
 (0.898) (0.998) (0.241) (0.313) 
Left political 
orientation, t-1 
0.017 0.025 -0.033* -0.025 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.019) (0.018) 
Real GDP growth 
forecasts 
0.851*** 0.947*** 0.882*** 1.304*** 
 (0.176) (0.141) (0.231) (0.353) 
     
Country effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
Time effects  No   Yes  No   Yes  
     
Observations 180 180 180 180 
R-squared 0.906 0.913 0.796 0.835 
Note: dependent variable is the logarithm of the input efficiency score using DEA-based Model 2 – refer to main text for details. 
Country and time effects omitted for reasons of parsimony. Constant term estimated but omitted. Robust standard errors 





Table C.3. Robustness Estimation: Endogeneity System GMM, Model 2 
 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Estimator  System GMM 
     
Lagged dependent variable 0.933*** 0.937*** 0.942*** 0.916*** 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.050) 
Population (log), t-1 -0.000 0.002 -0.001 -0.006 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) 
Debt (% GDP), t-1 0.006 0.002 0.008 0.032 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.035) 
Primary balance, t-1 0.131 0.147 0.050 0.192 
 (0.131) (0.127) (0.122) (0.164) 
Internet users (log), t-1 0.016 0.020 0.041 0.034 
 (0.031) (0.036) (0.045) (0.048) 
Tourism revenues (% exports), t-1 0.124 0.032 0.185 -0.008 
 (0.127) (0.118) (0.143) (0.230) 
Left political orientation, t-1 -0.021 -0.023 -0.022 -0.050** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.019) 
D base increasing, t-1 0.032**    
 (0.015)    
D base decreasing, t-1 -0.011    
 (0.015)    
D rate increasing, t-1 -0.025*    
 (0.012)    
D rate  decreasing, t-1 0.015    
 (0.014)    
D base increasing PIT, t-1  0.043**   
  (0.017)   
D base decreasing PIT, t-1  -0.033*   
  (0.018)   
D rate increasing PIT, t-1  -0.013   
  (0.014)   
D rate decreasing PIT, t-1  0.013   
  (0.047)   
D base increasing CIT, t-1   -0.002  
   (0.017)  
D base decreasing CIT, t-1   0.023*  
   (0.013)  
D rate increasing CIT, t-1   -0.052**  
   (0.020)  
D rate decreasing CIT, t-1   -0.005  
   (0.015)  
D base increasing VAT, t-1    0.027* 
    (0.015) 
D base decreasing VAT, t-1    0.078 
    (0.114) 
D rate increasing VAT, t-1    0.011 
    (0.026) 
D rate decreasing VAT, t-1    0.057 
     
Observations 162 162 162 162 
Hansen (p-value)  0.545 0.677 0.761 0.698 
AR2 (p-value) 0.797 0.370 0.380 0.176 
AR1 (p-value) 0.007 0.008 0.020 0.011 
Note:  dependent variable is the level of the efficiency score using DEA-based Model 2 – refer to main text for details. Hansen 
test evaluates the validity of the instrument set, i.e., tests for over-identifying restrictions. AR(1) and AR(2) are 
the Arellano–Bond autocorrelation tests of first and second order (the null is no autocorrelation), respectively.  
Country and time effects omitted for reasons of parsimony. Constant term estimated but omitted. Standard errors in parenthesis. 




Table C.4. Robustness Estimation: State-contingent, System GMM, Model 2 
 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) 




     
Lagged dependent variable 0.945*** 0.956*** 0.921*** 0.924*** 
 (0.029) (0.024) (0.028) (0.054) 
Population (log), t-1 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Debt (% GDP), t-1 0.011 0.007 0.014 0.024 
 (0.018) (0.016) (0.020) (0.033) 
Primary balance, t-1 0.161* 0.240*** 0.118 0.367** 
 (0.094) (0.083) (0.093) (0.152) 
Internet users (log), t-1 0.061 0.054 0.071 0.050 
 (0.052) (0.044) (0.055) (0.058) 
Tourism revenues (% exports), t-1 0.151 0.091 0.108 0.015 
 (0.126) (0.106) (0.164) (0.213) 
Left political orientation, t-1 -0.023* -0.019 -0.028* -0.045** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.017) 
D base increasing, t-1*recession 0.000    
 (0.030)    
D base increasing, t-1*expansion 0.049    
 (0.030)    
D base decreasing, t-1*recession -0.017    
 (0.022)    
D base decreasing, t-1*expansion 0.007    
 (0.042)    
D rate increasing, t-1*recession 0.023    
 (0.020)    
D rate increasing, t-1*expansion -0.065    
 (0.040)    
D rate decreasing, t-1*recession 0.002    
 (0.024)    
D rate decreasing, t-1*expansion 0.026    
 (0.046)    
D base increasing PIT, t-1 *recession  0.026   
  (0.032)   
D base increasing PIT, t-1 *expansion  0.054   
  (0.059)   
D base decreasing PIT, t-1 *recession  0.004   
  (0.026)   
D base decreasing PIT, t-1*expansion  -0.056   
  (0.064)   
D rate increasing PIT, t-1 *recession  0.005   
  (0.015)   
D rate increasing PIT, t-1*expansion  -0.028   
  (0.069)   
D rate decreasing PIT, t-1*recession  -0.046   
  (0.059)   
D rate decreasing PIT, t-1*expansion  0.067   
  (0.129)   
D base increasing CIT, t-1 *recession   0.069*  
   (0.037)  
D base increasing CIT, t-1 *expansion   -0.085  
   (0.053)  
D base decreasing CIT, t-1*recession   -0.031  
   (0.024)  
D base decreasing CIT, t-1*expansion   0.063***  
   (0.021)  
D rate increasing CIT, t-1*recession   -0.049  
   (0.036)  
D rate increasing CIT, t-1*expansion   -0.096**  
   (0.033)  
D rate decreasing CIT, t-1t*recession   -0.006  
   (0.034)  
D rate decreasing CIT, t-1*expansion   0.004  
   (0.044)  
D base increasing VAT, t-1 *recession    0.057 
    (0.053) 
D base increasing VAT, t-1 *expansion    -0.011 
    (0.027) 
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D base decreasing VAT, t-1*recession    -3.054 
    (2.933) 
D base decreasing VAT, t-1*expansion    1.132 
    (0.817) 
D rate increasing VAT, t-1*recession    0.055* 
    (0.027) 
D rate increasing VAT, t-1*expansion    -0.064 
    (0.066) 
D rate decreasing VAT, t-1*recession    0.009 
    (0.024) 
D rate decreasing VAT, t-1*expansion    0.223 
    (0.145) 
     
Observations 162 162 162 162 
R-squared     
Hansen (p-value)  0.988 0.989 0.977 0.983 
AR2 (p-value) 0.731 0.432   
AR1 (p-value) 0.008 0.007   
 
Note: dependent variable is the level of the efficiency score using DEA-based Model 2 – refer to main text for details. Hansen 
test evaluates the validity of the instrument set, i.e., tests for over-identifying restrictions. AR(1) and AR(2) are 
the Arellano–Bond autocorrelation tests of first and second order (the null is no autocorrelation), respectively.  
Country and time effects omitted for reasons of parsimony. Constant term estimated but omitted. Standard errors in parenthesis.  





Table C.5. Robustness Estimation: State-contingent, PCSE, Model 2 
 
Specification  (1) (2) (2) (4) 
Estimator  PCSE PCSE PCSE PCSE 
     
L.lneff2     
     
Population (log), t-1 1.144** 1.281** 1.048* 0.942 
 (0.534) (0.552) (0.546) (0.561) 
Debt (% GDP), t-1 0.251* 0.282** 0.246* 0.243* 
 (0.120) (0.119) (0.122) (0.137) 
Primary balance, t-1 1.669*** 1.701*** 1.586*** 1.622*** 
 (0.236) (0.242) (0.229) (0.215) 
Internet users (log), t-1 0.264 0.267 0.255 0.165 
 (0.181) (0.174) (0.185) (0.183) 
Tourism revenues (% exports), t-1 -1.412 -1.193 -1.232 -0.978 
 (1.116) (1.048) (1.102) (1.018) 
Left political orientation, t-1 0.028 0.039 0.030 0.023 
 (0.029) (0.032) (0.030) (0.030) 
D base increasing, t-1*recession 0.017    
 (0.023)    
D base increasing, t-1*expansion 0.008    
 (0.028)    
D base decreasing, t-1*recession -0.005    
 (0.031)    
D base decreasing, t-1*expansion 0.024    
 (0.023)    
D rate increasing, t-1*recession -0.082*    
 (0.040)    
D rate increasing, t-1*expansion 0.003    
 (0.033)    
D rate decreasing, t-1*recession 0.024    
 (0.028)    
D rate decreasing, t-1*expansion -0.025    
 (0.040)    
D base increasing PIT, t-1 *recession  0.037   
  (0.027)   
D base increasing PIT, t-1 *expansion  -0.028   
  (0.043)   
D base decreasing PIT, t-1 *recession  -0.005   
  (0.033)   
D base decreasing PIT, t-1*expansion  -0.004   
  (0.036)   
D rate increasing PIT, t-1 *recession  -0.104*   
  (0.051)   
D rate increasing PIT, t-1*expansion  0.011   
  (0.064)   
D rate decreasing PIT, t-1*recession  -0.020   
  (0.049)   
D rate decreasing PIT, t-1*expansion  0.058   
  (0.070)   
D base increasing CIT, t-1 *recession   -0.011  
   (0.051)  
D base increasing CIT, t-1 *expansion   0.022  
   (0.048)  
D base decreasing CIT, t-1*recession   -0.051**  
   (0.024)  
D base decreasing CIT, t-1*expansion   0.024  
   (0.030)  
D rate increasing CIT, t-1*recession   -0.033  
   (0.026)  
D rate increasing CIT, t-1*expansion   0.021  
   (0.032)  
D rate decreasing CIT, t-1t*recession   0.007  
   (0.030)  
D rate decreasing CIT, t-1*expansion   -0.003  
   (0.049)  
D base increasing VAT, t-1 *recession    0.007 
    (0.086) 
D base increasing VAT, t-1 *expansion    -0.037 
    (0.028) 
D base decreasing VAT, t-1*recession    -1.675*** 
    (0.264) 
D base decreasing VAT, t-1*expansion    0.779*** 
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    (0.102) 
D rate increasing VAT, t-1*recession    -0.041 
    (0.026) 
D rate increasing VAT, t-1*expansion    0.008 
    (0.019) 
D rate decreasing VAT, t-1*recession    0.032 
    (0.021) 
D rate decreasing VAT, t-1*expansion    -0.097*** 
    (0.017) 
     
Observations 162 162 162 162 
R-squared 0.944 0.944 0.940 0.946 
 
